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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 890324-CA 
v. : 
JUAN JOSE LOPEZ, JR., : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions of second degree 
murder, a first degree felony; and child abuse, a second degree 
felony. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-3a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989) based upon the order 
of the Utah Supreme Court transferring jurisdiction on May 19, 
1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was defendant entitled to severance of the two 
offenses that occurred at the same time and were incident to a 
single criminal objective where the evidence of the second 
offense was intertwined with the evidence of the first offense? 
2. Was it error for the trial court to refuse to give 
defendant's additional instruction on manslaughter when the jury 
was correctly instructed on manslaughter? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402 (1978)t 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a 
single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-401 (1978)t 
In this part unless the context requires a 
different definitionf "single criminal 
episode" means all conduct which is closely 
related in time and is incident to an attempt 
or an accomplishment of a single crimial 
objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to 
limit or modify the effect of section 77-21-
31 in controlling the joinder of offenses and 
defendants in criminal proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-9 (1978)t 
(a)Two or more offenses may be charged in the 
same indictment or information in a separate 
count for each offense if the offenses 
charged arise out of a criminal episode as 
defined in section 76-1-401. 
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of 
offenses . . . in an indictment or 
information, . . . the court shall order an 
election of separate trials of separate 
counts, . . . or provide such other relief as 
justice requires. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with second degree murder, 
a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203 
(Supp. 1989), and child abuse a second degree felony in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2) (Supp. 1989). A jury found 
defendant guilty of both charges on November 28, 1988. Judge 
John A. Rokich sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of five 
years to life for second degree murder and one to fifteen years 
for child abuse. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early morning hours of March 2, 1988 defendant 
stabbed his girlfriend, Cindy Hernandez, to death with an eight 
inch kitchen knife while her seven year old son, Roberto, watched 
(T. 72-4, 133, 147, 263). After stabbing Ms. Hernandez, 
defendant rifled through her purse (T. 74-5). When Roberto asked 
defendant if his mother was allright, defendant began choking him 
until he passed out (T. 77-8). Defendant told Roberto if he told 
anyone, defendant would kill him (T. 78). Defendant fled the 
State, and was eventually arrested in Burley, Idaho (T. 177). 
Defendant lived in Ms. Hernandez' home with her and her 
three children (T. 62-4, 85). On the evening before the 
homicide, Ms. Hernandez left the home and went to a bar (T. 63, 
88-9). Later, defendant left the children alone while he went to 
look for Ms. Hernandez (T. 31-2, 65, 273). Defendant returned 
home alone much later (T. 69, 76-7). After defendant returned 
home, three or four people came to visit him and purchased drugs 
from him (T. 70, 243, 78, 307-08). They went into the bathroom 
and used the drugs (T. 98-9, 307-08). 
Ms. Hernandez returned home while defendant's friends 
were there (T. 70, 245, 281). A white male, who stayed outside 
the door, arrived with her (T. 245, 281). Ms. Hernandez said she 
did not want defendant's friends in her house, told them to leave 
and started to call the police (T. 70-1, 102-3, 246-7). (Her 
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attempt to call someone is corroborated by the fact that the 
telephone was off the hook near her body the next morning (ex. 4-
S, ex. 9-S)). All but one of the people in the apartment, 
defendant's friend Chito, did leave immediately (T. 70-1, 246-7, 
309). 
Defendant and Ms. Hernandez began fighting and 
defendant threw her against the wall (T. 71). Defendant came out 
of the kitchen with a knife and pushed Ms. Hernandez into some 
pottery (T. 72-3). Defendant raised the knife above his head and 
"made it go down fast" into Roberto's mother while Roberto 
watched (T. 73-4). Roberto said that Chito stayed in the hallway 
while defendant hit and stabbed his mother (T. 107). Chito hit 
his mother after defendant stabbed her (T. 108). Roberto went 
into his own room and heard a lot of screaming before it finally 
became quiet (T. 74). 
There were six cuts on Ms. Hernandez' body all together 
(T. 139) along with several blunt trauma injuries (T. 140-42). 
Three of the stab wounds were potentially life threatening (T. 
144). The most serious of these entered the right side of her 
neck, severed the food pipe, the left carotid artery, the left 
subclavian artery and continued through the left lung into the 
inner surface of the back side of the chest cavity (T. 131-
2,144). A second wound cut the fourth and fifth right ribs, into 
the lung, through the diaphragm, into the liver, back through the 
diaphragm and nicked the lung again (T. 135-36). A third entered 
the right shoulder, through the arm, into the chest cavity 
without exiting the armpit, between the third and fourth ribs and 
into the lung (T. 137). 
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After the screaming stopped, Roberto came to the door 
of his bedroom and asked defendant if his mother was allright (T. 
76). Defendant told Roberto that he should go to bed, that his 
mother was allright, and that she was just sleeping (T. 76). 
Roberto asked defendant why he had blood all over him and 
defendant told Roberto that he beat up "the guy who wouldn't 
leave" (T. 76). Roberto kept insisting he wanted to see his 
mother and defendant began choking Roberto, first with his hands, 
and then with a vacuum cleaner cord (T. 77). It hurt and Roberto 
held his breath to keep from passing out (T. 77-8, 82). When 
defendant stopped strangling Roberto, he said if Roberto told 
anyone, he would kill him (T. 78). 
The ligature caused extreme petechial hemmorhages over 
Roberto's skin and in the white of his eye (T. 151-2, 154, ex. 
12-S, 13-S, 14-S, 15-S, 16-S). Petechia is caused when blood 
vessels burst because the high pressure blood continues to pump 
into the head but a ligature blocks the flow of low pressure 
blood out of the head (T. 151-2). This was a particularly 
impressive example of petechia, seen normally on dead persons, 
which was potentially life-threatening (T. 153-4). 
Chito told defendant to wash the knife and put it back 
(T. 110). Defendant cpvered Ms. Hernandez with a blanket after 
tying her hands together with a cord (T. 51-3, 142-3, 289). 
Chito left the apartment at least 10 minutes after the others 
(246-7). Defendant fled and was arrested on March 14, 1988 in 
Burley, I<Jaho (T. 177). 
After he was arrested, defendant told police officers 
three different stories about the stabbing. First, defendant 
denied involvement completely, claiming that he left the 
apartment before Ms. Hernandez returned that evening and went to 
Evanston (T. 184). He said he believed Chito was responsible for 
her death. 
Next, defendant said that they fought because Ms. 
Hernandez said that the unidentified white man was her new 
boyfriend (T. 187-88). Ms. Hernandez tried to stab him but 
missed and stabbed herself (T. 189). With the knife in her 
chest, Ms. Hernandez talked with defendant for one and one-half 
to two hours while defendant begged her to go to the hospital (T. 
190). She begged him to end it for her and he eventually gave in 
and stabbed her twice more (T. 190). Defendant said he panicked 
and began choking Roberto when Roberto began screaming and crying 
(T. 191-2). He thought Roberto was dead, but he was not sure (T. 
192). 
At trial, defendant said that he lied to the officers 
because they were rude to him (T. 298-99, 303). He testified 
that he could not remember stabbing Ms. Hernandez but explained 
that he did it because he was upset when she brought home a new 
boyfriend and because she called him a "mother-fucker" and told 
him to get out of the apartment (T. 281-87). He said he had been 
upset earlier in the evening beause she seemed to be shirking her 
duties as a mother and leaving the care of her children to him 
(T. 273-75). He said he could not remember choking Roberto or 
tying Ms. Hernandez' hands (T. 89, 302-03). 
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After the stabbing, defendant testified that he went to 
his father's home with bllod all over him (T. 289). When his 
father saw him and defendant would not say what happened, 
defendant said his father tied him up and took him back to the 
apartment where they saw the body (T. 290-91). His father wanted 
him to leave the country and they drove to Reno (T. 291-92). 
Defendant put his father on a plane to Mexico and drove himself 
to Wendover and then to Burley, Idaho where he was arrested (T. 
293-4). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant was not entitled to severance of the charges 
because they were part of a single criminal episode and defendant 
was not unfairly prejudiced by the joinder. The evidence of both 
charges was inextricably intertwined and the evidence of 
defendant choking Roberto was relevant to his state of mind at 
the time of the murder. 
The prosecutor did misstate the law on the definition 
of manslaughter, however, defense counsel clarified the mistake 
at the time and the jury was correctly instructed on the elements 
of manslaughter. Thus, defendant was not prejudiced by the trial 
court's refusal to give an instruction that merely restated the 
definition of extreme emotional disturbance already contained in 
the instructions given to the jury. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SEVERANCE OF 
THE CHARGES. 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to sever the child 
abuse charge from the second degree murder charge asserting that 
they were not part of a single criminal episode and that he was 
prejudiced by the joinder. Judge Rokich denied the motion and 
both counts were tried together. 
There is no question that two charges arising from a 
single criminal episode can be tried together absent prejudice to 
the prosecution or defense. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-402 and 77-
35-9 (1978 and 1982). In fact, the State must charge multiple 
offenses that are part of a single criminal episode together or 
be forever barred from prosecuting the defendant for the charges 
arising from the same episode. Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-403 (1978). 
Denial of a motion to sever separate counts of a single 
information will be reversed only where the trial court abused 
its discretion. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985). 
Thus, the trial court's decision in this case should be affirmed 
unless the court abused its discretion in determining that the 
acts were part of a single criminal episode and that defendant 
was not prejudiced by their joinder. 
Defendant's first contention, that these crimes were 
not part of a single criminal episode is meritless. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-401 (1982) defines a single criminal episode as 
-conduct that is closely related in time and is incident to an 
attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective." 
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These two crimes are not only close in time, they are virtually 
inseparable. Defendant choked Roberto because Roberto witnessed 
the stabbing of his mother just moments before and kept insisting 
that he see if his mother was allright. 
Defendant's assertion that the acts are "not 
necessarily closely related in time" is absurd. The evidence 
reveals that the child abuse followed the homicide almost 
immediately. The acts were not separated by as much as one day 
or the time it takes to drive 65 miles such as were the acts 
discussed in State v. Bair# 671 P.2d 203, 206 (Utah 1983). There 
is no question that the two crimes here were also closely related 
in time. Burglaries that were separated by the time it took for 
a defendant to move from a laundry room to an apartment in the 
same building were found to be close enough in time to be a 
single criminal episode. State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 
1985). 
Furthermore, these crimes arose from a single criminal 
objective. That objective was to kill Cindy Hernandez and to 
cover up the crime by making it appear that she was killed by 
someone who was robbing her and to cover up the murder further by 
eliminating the eye witness. 
While State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977), 
superficially appears to support defendant's position, it is 
distinguishable. The Court there did not want to inextricably 
entangle crimes committed at later times to avoid apprehension 
for earlier crimes as always being part of a single episode. The 
Court did not, however, state that they are never part of a 
single criminal episode and should never be joined. 
In Cornishf the two crimes that the prosecutor wished 
to join were vehicle theft and failure to stop when the police 
officer spotted Cornish the next day. These crimes were not 
close in time and were not necessarily related but only 
fortuitously so. If the officer had not spotted Cornish, the 
second crime would not have been committed and was only 
incidentally the result of the previous crime. Defendant urges a 
very broad reading of Cornish upon this Court in claiming that 
there was not a single criminal objective in this case. Defendant 
reads Cornish to say that crimes committed to avoid detection of 
another crime# even those committed nearly simultaneously with 
the first crime, are never part of a single criminal episode. On 
the contrary, all that Cornish says is that the crimes in that 
particular case were not part of a single criminal episode. The 
crimes in this case were, however, part of a single episode and 
were properly joined. 
The final aspect of this issue is whether defendant was 
prejudiced by joinder of the offenses. Because a defendant is 
always prejudiced by the State's evidence in the sense that it 
tends to prove his guilt, the question is actually whether 
defendant was unfairly prejudiced by joinder of the child abuse 
charge. C£. State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah 1989) 
(evidence that tends to prove element of crime admissible unless 
unfairly prejudicial). Defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by 
joinder of the two offenses because the child abuse was relevant 
to show defendant's state of mind at the time of the homicide. 
Even if the State had not joined the two charges, the 
evidence would have been admissible under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) 
(1989), to show intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake or 
accident. Jamison, 767 P.2d at 137. The evidence was very 
probative of these factors where defendant claimed that he did 
not intend to kill Ms. Hernandez and did not recall the homicide 
because he was so upset at the time of the stabbing. One of the 
most highly probative aspects of Roberto's testimony was that 
while defendant was choking him, defendant stated that if Roberto 
told anyone what had happened, defendant would kill him. This 
evidence could not have been presented without also establishing 
the child abuse. Because M[i]ntent is an element that often can 
be proved only by means of circumstantial proof," State v. 
Valdez, 748 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1987) (citation omitted), the State 
needed Roberto's testimony to aid in establishing defendant's 
intent. Thus, defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by joinder 
because the State would have introduced the evidence of child 
abuse in any event. 
Because the State would have attempted to introduce the 
evidence under Rule 404(b) if the charges were severed, the 
balancing of probativeness against prejudicial effect was 
relevant to Judge Rokich's determination. Although the Judge did 
not articulate this clearly, it is logical that he would consider 
the harmlessness of the joinder where the evidence would be 
admissible in any event. No doubt, Judge Rokich was simply 
thinking about whether he would likely admit the evidence under 
404(b) when he indicated his inclination to weigh the pobative 
value against the prejudicial effect. Consequently, even though 
probativeness versus unfair prejudice balancing is not expressly 
a part of the § 77-35-9 severance determination, it was a factor 
that the Judge needed to consider in determining the question of 
whether defendant would suffer unfair prejudice from joinder in 
this case and it was not error for Judge Rokich to engage in the 
balancing test. See State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 
1987) (severance of charge did not make it inadmissible in trial 
of other charge if admissible under Rule 404(b)). 
Although the fact that defendant choked Roberto is 
probative of his mental state at the time he killed Ms. 
Hernandez, defendant claims that it was irrelevant to the second 
degree murder charge. He relies on State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 
1214 (Utah 1985)/ for the proposition that events occurring after 
a homicide are not to be considered in establishing the mens rea 
for the homicide. Bolsinger does not stand for this proposition. 
The language quoted by defendant does not state such a rule. 
All the court in Bolsinger indicated was that other evidence of 
intent to kill in that case was so lacking, that the evidence 
that defendant afterward stole a stereo from the decedent did not 
Defendant quotes the following passage: 
The jury may well have been swayed by the 
reprehensible conduct of the defendant 
subsequent to her death. But that conduct is 
not before us for review. The evidence is 
undisputed that [the victim] was dead when 
defendant arose from the bed. He himself 
covered her face with a sheet, a universal 
gesture acknowledging death. At that moment 
the conduct which subjected him to a charge 
of criminal homicide came to an end. 
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persuade the court that there was sufficient evidence of intent 
to kill. 
In fact# if defendant's misstatement of the law were 
the rule, then defendant's testimony that he kissed Ms. Hernandez 
on the cheek and closed her eyes after he stabbed her was also 
irrelevant to his mental state at the time of the homicide. As 
was his testimony about how his father tied him up and returned 
him to the apartment to determine what had occurred because 
defendant was nonresponsive to his father's inquiries. Surely 
defendant does not suggest that he should have been precluded 
from presenting such testimony. 
A rule that acts committed after a homicide are 
irrelevant to the crime would be inconsistent with the holdings 
in other cases that certain activities of a defendant after a 
crime are relevant to the crime. For example, flight after a 
crime can be used by a jury to infer that a defendant is guilty 
of the crime charged. See State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 
1983). Also, a defendant's confession or inconsistent 
statements made after the crime are relevant to prove the crime, 
Utah R. Evid. 801; his possession of recently stolen property may 
be used by the jury to infer that he stole the property, Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-6-402(1) (1978); State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232 
(Utah 1986); and his alteration of the appearance of a stolen 
vehicle corroborates the charge that he stole it, State v. 
Clayton, 658 P.2d 621 (Utah 1983). Evidently, defendant's acts 
occurring after a crime are not per se irrelevant to the crime. 
- i * . 
Defendant acknowledges in his brief that the jury might 
have used the strangling of Roberto to infer that defendant 
intended to kill Ms. Hernandez. He claims, however, that this 
was improper. Defendant's argument on this point is weak. 
Certainly the jury would have had less evidence from which to 
infer intent without Roberto's testimony of the abuse, but that 
fact supports the State's desire to use the evidence rather than 
defendant's desire to exclude it. Agreeably, defendant was 
prejudiced by the evidence, but he was not unfairly prejudiced by 
it. 
Defendant also asserts that doubts about prejudice from 
joinder of offenses should be resolved in favor of the defendant. 
The cases he cites, however, do not stand for this proposition. 
State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1980) states nothing 
of the sort. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 444-45 (Utah 1986), 
stands for the rule that doubts about severance of defendants 
should be resolved in favor of the defendants rather than the 
State. There is no indication that such a rule is applicable to 
severance of counts in an information that are properly joined as 
part of a single criminal episode. Indeed, joinder is wholly 
within the discretion of the trial court and that discretion will 
not be overturned lightly. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 740 
(Utah 1985). 
Because the evidence was admissible even if the counts 
had been severed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by joinder. 
Judge Rokich's ruling should, therefore, be affirmed. 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY CLAIM THAT THE JURY 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN A CURATIVE INSTRUCTION 
ON THE PROSECUTOR'S MISSTATEMENT OF THE LAW 
AND THE JURY WAS# IN ANY EVENT, PROPERLY 
INSTRUCTED. 
Defendant complains that the prosecutor misstated the 
law of manslaughter when he told the jury that a reasonable man 
would not have killed Ms. Hernandez. He links his motion for a 
mistrial based upon this misstatement with his earlier request 
for an additional paragraph in the manslaughter instruction that 
explained that the killing need not be reasonable, only the 
extreme emotional disturbance need be reasonable, and urges 
reversal of his conviction of manslaughter. 
Defendant's argument amounts to a request for the first 
time on appeal that the jury be given a curative instruction on 
the correct law of manslaughter. A request that was waived by 
his failure to make it at trial. State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 
1292 (Utah 1982). When defense counsel objected to the 
prosecutor's misstatement, she herself gave a correct statement 
of the law and the court agreed with her. She did not request at 
that time that the court give a further curative instruction. 
Later, she stated for the record her earlier objection 
to the failure to give the jury instruction that had been 
requested prior to closing arguments when the jury instructions 
were initially developed. She separately requested a mistrial 
based only upon the prosecutor's misstatement of the law but did 
not request that the court give a curative instruction. Instead, 
she stopped with the request for a mistrial. She did not say 
that her explanation of the correct law was insufficient to 
apprise the jury of the prosecutor's mistake but, instead, 
claimed that the mistake was so egregious, the fact that it 
occurred should result in a mistrial. In these circumstances, 
defendant cannot argue that he requested a curative jury 
instruction that the trial court improperly denied. 
Most important is that the jury, nevertheless, heard a 
correct statement of the law of manslaughter and were given 
written instructions that correctly stated the law. The trial 
court read these instructions to the jury before closing 
arguments and defense counsel interjected the correct law at the 
time of the misstatement. Thus, defendant cannot complain that 
the jury was not fully apprised of the prosecutor's error and of 
the correct law. 
Even if this Court considers defendant's claims 
separately as an erroneous denial of a jury instruction and an 
erroneous denial of a mistrial, his conviction should be 
affirmed. Considering first the issue of the jury instruction, 
the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction 
even though it was an accurate statement of the law because the 
jury was properly and sufficiently instructed on the law of 
manslaughter. Jury Instruction 23 describing the elements of 
manslaughter reads, in pertinent parts 
2. That Juan Jose Lopez, Jr., caused said 
death under the influence of extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse. 
(R. 124). Jury Instruction 28 further states, in pertinent part: 
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In determining whether or not the defendant 
acted under the influence of extreme 
emotional disturbance, you should consider 
all of the circumstances surrounding the 
death of Cindy Hernandez. If you find that 
the defendant, JUAN LOPEZ, caused the death 
of Cindy Hernandez while under the influence 
of extreme emotional disturbance, you must 
next determine whether or not there was a 
reasonable explanation for such disturbance. 
The reasonableness of the explanation or 
excuse for the extreme emotional disturbance 
is to be determined from the viewpoint of a 
reasonable person under the then existing 
circumstances. 
(R. 129). These instructions make it clear that it is the 
extreme emotional disturbance that must be reasonable and not the 
killing. The manslaughter statute provides that 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter if the actor: 
(b) causes the death of another under the 
influence of extreme emotional disturbance 
for which there is a reasonable explanation 
or excuse . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (Supp. 1989). The paragraph defendant 
wanted to include was accurate, but it was unnecessary because 
the instructions given were also an accurate reflection of the 
law. There is no error in refusing to give instructions that are 
merely repetitive of principles adequately explained in other 
instructions. State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Utah 1984). 
Normally, instructions worded in the statutory language are 
considered to be correct and sufficient. State v. Maestas, 652 
P.2d 903, 907 (Utah 1982). In fact, the jury in State v. Bishop, 
652 P.2d 439, 468 (Utah 1988), was instructed with nearly 
identical language. The Supreme Court held that this language 
did not require the jury to find that the killings were 
reasonable and refused to reverse Bishop's conviction on this 
basis. Because the jury was accurately instructed on 
manslaughter, it was not reversible error for the trial court to 
refuse to give defendant's requested additional instruction. 
The second aspect of defendants claim is that the 
prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he stated in closing 
argument: M. . . would a reasonable man that night have stabbed 
Cindy Hernandez to death? . . . But a reasonable man would not 
kill Cindy Hernandez because she had another boyfriend." The 
prosecutor did misstate the law in these comments to the jury, 
however, defendant was not prejudiced by the misstatements 
because defense counsel correctly stated the law in her immediate 
objection and because the jury was properly instructed on the 
definition of manslaughter. 
So, even though it was misconduct for the prosecutor to 
misstate the law, this Court should not reverse defendant's 
conviction because the jurors were probably not influenced by the 
remarks. See State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). It 
is unlikely that defendant would have received a more favorable 
result even if the prosecutor had not made the inaccurate remarks 
and confidence in the verdict is not undermined, see State v. 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988), because there was 
overwhelming evidence of intent along with evidence making 
defendant's theory incredible. For these reasons, Judge Rokich 
did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. 
State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 527 P.2d 1322 (1974) (court will 
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reverse denial of motion for mistrial only where is was clear 
abuse of discretion). 
Defendant sold drugs to his friends in Ms. Hernandez' 
apartment on the night of her death. When Ms. Hernandez came 
home and demanded that his customers leave and attempted to call 
the police, defendant became angry and began pushing her around. 
Defendant retrieved the knife from the kitchen and then used it 
on Ms. Hernandez. Immediately after stabbing Ms. Hernandez to 
death, defendant began rifling through her purse. He tried to 
cover up the murder by strangling her son with his hands and with 
a vacuum cleaner cord after Roberto asked about his mother's 
well-being and noted the blood on defendant's clothing. 
Defendant told Roberto he would kill him if Roberto told anyone 
what had happened. 
Defendant's theory that he suffered from an extreme 
emotional disturbance is implausible. He admitted to selling 
drugs that night and asserted that he never sold drugs in bars, 
only in his home. He said that he was disturbed by Ms. Hernandez 
selling drugs in bars. Every witness who was there that night 
testified that Ms. Hernandez was angry when she came home and 
found defendant's customers there. Roberto said that she started 
to call the police and his story is corroborated by the fact that 
the telephone was off the hook on the floor near the body. Thus, 
the evidence points to some sort of disagreement about the drug 
sale, rather than defendant's claim that it was about Ms. 
Hernandez' new boyfriend. 
Even if the argument was about the new boyfriend and 
defendant's refusal to leave the apartment, it is unlikely that a 
jury would find that this created an extreme emotional 
disturbance that was reasonably explained or justified. This is 
especially true since defendant claimed at trial that he was so 
upset he did not know what he was doing and could not recall the 
stabbing but had told inconsistent stories to police officers. 
First he denied any knowledge of the stabbing, whatsoever. He 
also said that he believed Chito stabbed her and that he was in 
Idaho looking for Chito because of her death. Then he said that 
Ms. Hernandez accidentally stabbed herself and that he mercifully 
finished her off. Having heard these stories, it is unlikely 
that the jury believed that defendant could not recall stabbing 
Ms. Hernandez or strangling Roberto or that defendant was under 
the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance. 
It is also unlikely that they thought the disturbance 
was reasonably explained or justified by ingestion of drugs and 
alcohol or by an ethnic reaction to the term "mother-fucker" or 
to being told that Ms. Hernandez had a new boyfriend, or by any 
combination of these things. For these reasons, defendant was 
not prejudiced by the prosecutor's inaccurate remarks and 
defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm defendant's convictions. 
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